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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
AMY P. JOHN"SOX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.WILLIAM T. MAYNARD,
Defendant and Respondent.

NATURE OF CASE
This is an intersection case. We think it proper to
make a few preliminary observations which must be considered by this court in arriving at a cle.ar solution of the
various points argued by appellant.
The trial court submitted the case to a jury on a
general verdict. No request for .a special verdict or for
answers to special interrogatories was proposed by either
plaintiff or defendant. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of defendant. In the case of,
Horsley vs. Robin son
112 Utah 227
186 P. 2nd, 592
this court says :
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"Under a general verdict we cannot be assured
what facts the jury found or that they found the
facts necessary to sustain their verdict. So it is
universally held under the common law system,
as it must be, in order to give stability to jury verdict, that the appellate court must sustain the
verdict where the evidence is sufficient to support
a finding of the necessary facts to do so."
If, therefore, there was evidence upon which the jury
could find either:
(a)

That defendant was not negligent, he being
the driver of an emergency vehicle responding to an emergency call; or

(b)

That, if the plaintiff was herself guilty of
contributory negligence contributing proximately to her injury, then this court cannot
set aside the verdict.

Furthermore, this being an action at law under the repeated decisions of this court, an appellate court must
view the evidence in its most favorable aspect to support
the general verdict which the jury has rendered. See,
Horsley vs. Robin son, Supra
Pixton vs. Dunn
120 Utah 658
238 P. 2nd, 408
"The trial court, at the conclusion of the case,
elected to accept as true the evidence presented by
respondent and to reject as untrue that introduced
by appellant. That disposes of this issue because
this being an action at law, the appellate court is
powerless to substitute another evaluation of the
evidence for that of the trial court where such
evidenee wa~ <'onflicting."

2
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Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company
106 Utah 289
147 P. 2nd, 875
"This is a case at law. It, therefore, follows
that this appeal is upon questions of law alone.
That being true, the function of this court is not
to pass upon the weight of the evidence nor to
determine conflicts therein, but to examine it
solely for the purpose of determining whether or
not the judgment finds substantial support in the
evidence. In so examining the evidence, all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the trial court's
findings and judgment and the wl;idence must
be considered in the light most favorable to them."
Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, Inc.
122 Utah 312
249 P. 2nd, 213
says,
":Matters of negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause generally are jury
questions unless evidentiary facts are of such
conclusive character as to require all reasonable
minds to conclude that ultimate fact of negligence,
contributory negligence or proximate cause does
or does not exist."
In fact, the courts in many jurisdirtions are now pretty
well committed to the doctrine that contributory negligence is in nearly every case a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. We shall merely ei te a few of these
cases, which are legion:
Hancock vs. Thejfin
Oklahoma
256 P. 2nd, 428

3
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Shelton vs. Lowell
Oregon
249 P. 2nd, 958
Hines vs. Neuner
Washington
253 P. 2nd, 942
Borgia vs. Anselmi
Wyoming
258 P. 2nd, 796
Counsel has fallen into the error so frequently indulged in, in this, that in his statement of facts, counsel
has referred to the evidence in the light most favorable
to the appellant rather than in the light most favorable
to the defendant. We contend that judging the evidence
in the light most favorable to the respondent that the
following facts are deducible from the evidence:
At the time of the accident defendant was a policeman
en1ployed in the Traffic Department of Ogden City. He
was driving a 1954 Ford automobile owned by Ogden
City which was equipped with a revolving red light on its
top and a siren near the left front. This equip1nent complied with the statutory regulations required for emergency vehicles. Tr. 332 to 335. Immediately preceding
the .accident, defendant was driving said automobile
~orthward on Washington Boulevard in the outside lane
at about twenty five 1uiles per hour. He was follo"\\i.ng
two cars. \Yhen he was between twenty eighth and twenty
ninth streets he turned on his radio which pern1itted him
to eommunicate with the dispatcher at police headquarters. (He described the intercon1n1unicating system
''Pr. 334). \Vhen he was just South of twenty eighth street
4
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he began his conversation with the dispatcher who was
then calling the ambulance. The dispatcher called for car
fourteen (not defendant's car) and then he asked for .a
10-20, which means the station is asking for your location.
By this time defendant had just passed Rigo's Cafe on the
North side of twenty eighth street. Defendant gave his
location as .approaching twenty seventh street. The dispatcher then told defendant to assist car fourteen at a
fatal accident on twenty fifth and :Monroe, whereupon
defendant started to pick up speed. He was still on the
outside lane. Tr. 336-337. He then started to swing into
the inner lane to pass the cars in front. Defendant was
then opposite the Lynada Motel. ( ~ee Plaintiff's Exhibit
"A" for location and measured distances of various points
to the point of the accident.)
Defendant turned on the red light and the ;-;iren as
soon as the dispatcher told him to assist car fourteen.
(NOTE: This record was played and replayed nurnerous
times to the jury. It discloses that at the instant the dispatcher told defendant to assist car fourteen, the siren
was kicked on by defendant. Tr. 340.)
Defendant removed his foot off the ~ 1 n•n button to
push his clutch in as he shifted inio ~c·('(Jild gear to pick
up speed and as he was turning into the inside lane he
then hit the siren button as soon as he hacl finished shifting. At that time he was by the bank. At Llmt time he
was travelling between thirty .and thirty five miles per
hour. The speedometer on this car was placed in an elevated position so that he could glance at his speed without
lowering his head. It was raining a little at the time.
5
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'rhere was no south bound traffic on W .ashington Boulevard, so that the entire West half was entirely unobstructed. Its width is shown to be forty two feet from center
to curb. He could see the intersection of twenty seventh
street to the West. He looked to the West and saw no
cars, either in the intersection or approaching the inter:section. However, he was more concerned about cars
corning from the right which would be West bound down
twenty seventh because of cars proceeding Northward
on the outside l.ane and the Ogden Ford Sales sign on the
Southeast corner of the intersection which obstructed
his view of West bound automobiles. He looked to his
left and saw that that was clear. He then looked to the
East and glanced at his speedometer because he was keeping his car below forty miles per hour. He then glanced
up straight .ahead and the Johnson car was directly in
front of him. At that time his speedometer read thirty
seven rniles per hour.
Defendant was instructed by his superior officer that
where an ambulance had been called that we were to proceed on an emergency basis. Defendant turned on the red
lights and siren when he was opposite the Browning used
e.a r lot South of the bank and he continued from there to
the point of the accident with his red light burning and
his :siren sounding. The distance to the bank is shown on
plaintiff's Exhibit "A." There were no obstructions of
any kind to interfere with the plaintiff's view so that as
Hhe proceeded into the intersection and toward the center
Hhe had a clear and unobstructed view of the en1ergency
vehiele proceeding N" orthw.ard on the inside lane for a
6
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distance of one hundred eighty feet frmn the South curb
line on twenty seventh to the North line of the bank building. The point of contact, however, was nineteen feet
North of the South curb line of twenty seventh street,
so that the defendant's emergency vehicle travelled a total
distance of at least two hundred feet with the siren
sounding and the revolving light lighted.
No one saw the plaintiff enter the intersection. The
witness Cox was standing on the South side of his car
which was parked at the curb approximately one hundred
nineteen feet South of the point of contact. He state8
that when the defendant's vehicle passed him, the siren
was sounding and the lights were burning. He then looked
up and saw plaintiff's car which was then near the center
of the intersection. He estimates that it was travelling
from five to seven miles per hour and that it travelled
approximately six feet East of the semaphore light where
it was struck. See Tr. 131 to 146. The only other witnesH
who saw the plaintiff's car before the accident was
Howard Clay whose car was parked in front of the Community Bakery. He stated that after the patrol car had
passed him, he looked to the North anu noticed the plaintiff's automobile proceeding East .across tilt> intersection
travelling not less than five miles per hour hut not more
than seven miles per hour to his best judgment. Tr. 113.
However, he does not attempt to point out where the
Johnson car was when he first saw it, or how far it had
proceeded into the intersection.
The jury, therefore, had a right to infer that the
plaintiff proceeded into the intersection and through the

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\Vest half of W.ashington Boulevard travelling at a speed
of between five and seven miles per hour; that her view
was unobstructed and there was nothing to prevent her
seeing the automobile., or hearing the siren.
In judging whether or not there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence, we desire to call the court's attention to the case of,
Hickoff vs. Skinner
113 Utah 1
190 P. 2nd 51-!
While this case does not involve an emergency vehicle, it
is a so-called intersection case and to that extent supports
our position that on this evidence the jury could find that
even though the defendant was guilty of negligence, yet
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence barring
her right of recovery. \Ve shall take the liberty of quoting from this case. The court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Latimer, says:
"Plaintiff had an unobstructed view the full
length of the block to the East. Defendant's speed,
according to what defendant told the investigating
officers, was 45 mph, the posted speed limit for
that street being 35 mph. There were no skid
1narks before the impact occurred. Plaintiff, not
having seen defendant's car after the first observation of it, made no attempt to avoid .a collision,
and defendant made little, if any, effort to prevent
the hnpact."
"Under these facts the trial court found the
plaintiff to have been guilty of contributory negligeneP as a. n1atter of law. and .accordingly entered
a judgment of nonsuit."
8
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"Granted that the defendant should have
yielded the right of way, that does not absolve
plaintiff of negligence for his prolonged inattention to the traffic that w.as approaching West on
21st South."
"The scope of. plaintiff's vision would have
permitted him to have seen the automobile approaching without the necessity of turning his
head completely around to the right. The time
element, even if it were less than is shown by
the evidence, was such that a reasonably prudent
.and careful person would have looked to the East
several times while traversing the diHtance from
the stop sign to the point of collision. One look
to the East before crossing the center line of 21st
South Street would have disclosed to the plaintiff
that he was about to enter the path of a rapidly
moving vehicle, and. that if he·continued forward,
a collision of the two vehicles would most likely
occur. Furthermore, .at the relatively slow speed
plaintiff was travelling, he could easily have made
an immediate stop in time to have avoided the
collision which did take pla('e."
Quoting from the Bullock vs. Luke case, which lays
down. the following rule :
"regardless of which driver is terhnically entitled to the right of w.ay, both operators must
use due care and caution in proceeding into and
across intersections. * * • * there should be placed
on both the burden to keep a proper lookout and
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither
should be permitted to close his· eyes to other
vehicles which he knows or has reason to believe
are .approaching, simply because a state statute
or municipal ordinance designates him the preferred driver. The rights of drivers approaching
and crossing intersections are r<'lative. Both

9
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drivers have the duties of being heedful and of
maintaining a proper lookout. Plaintiff was
neglectful in both particulars, and no jury could
reasonably find that he was not negligent. * * • •
It is not unusual for drivers crossing a wide
arterial highway such as this to proceed across
the near half of the street and then stop or come
to a near stop near the middle to permit the passage of through traffic on the other half. The
evidence having established 45 mph as the speed
of defendant's car, his opportunity to avoid the
collision would be extremely limited."
In our case, the court did not rule as a matter of
law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence but he submitted this issue to the jury under proper
instructions. It is difficult for us to understand how,
in the face of this record, it could be argued that the
rourt could have instructed the jury that as a matter
of law the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. To have done so would have constituted reversible
error.
If the jury found from the evidence, as they might
well have done, that plaintiff was proceeding Easterly
through the intersection at a speed of five miles per hour
and the defendant was travelling K orthward at a speed
or thirty seven miles per hour, defendant would be
travelling 7.4 times as fast as plaintiff. Therefore, while
defendant was travelling approximately 220 feet (distance testified to by defendant) with light burning and
siren sounding, plaintiff would have to travel 30 feet
in order that both cars could reach the point of impact
at. the same time. Officer Bennett testified that a car

10
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travelling five miles per hour can be stopped in 6.538
feet, which includes reaction time. Tr. 172-173. The jury
could therefore conclude that plaintiff travelled thirty
feet through the West half of
ashington Boulevard
while the emergency car was approaching with its lights
flashing and siren sounding, a situation very similar to
the facts in the

''T

Hickok vs. Skinner case
Cited Supra
absent, however, the question of the emergency vehicle
rule.
Appellant suggests that there was a light sprinkle
of rain falling. Certainly a slight rain could not interfere or impede the sound of the siren and if the sky
was overcast and stormy this would .add to and not
detract from plaintiff's ability to observe the revolving
red light. Yet, in the face of these facts, plaintiff drove
slowly through the intersection and passed the center
semaphore six feet where she was struck, llflhrithstanding the obvious fact that she could have stopped bei'on•
reaching the center, or she could have huT <>d either to
her right or left, inasmuch as no traffic was moving
on the West half of Washington Boulevard, and thereby
could have avoided the accident.
In the face of this record, we find it difficult to
understand how appellant can contend that J>laintiff was
not guilty of contributory negligence as a 1r.atter of law.
Was the defendant guilty of negligence as a matter
of law~ This question involves a consideration of the
11
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law applicable to emergency vehicles and is tied in with
appellant's statement of Point Number Two with respect
to the giving of instructions five and six. The so-called
emergency exemption was formerly found in Section
-:l-1-6-14, U.C.A., at which time the law provided:
"C.

The driver of an authorized emergency
vehicle may:
1. Park or stand irrespective of the provisions of this Act,

2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop
sign, but only after slowing down as may
be necessary for safe operation.
However, the legislature repealed this act and adopted
an entirely new act, which became effective in 1955, and
this act excludes the provision contained in two, supra,
which requires a slow down as may be necessary for s.afe
operation. Under the 1955 Act, there is no requirement
for an emergency vehicle to slow down when approaching
an intersection. The 1955 Act further repeals practically
all of the traffi~ rules and regulations which .are applicable to other drivers upon the highway, so that we
have a situation where the driver of an e1nergency vehicle
under the 1955 Act is relieved of obeying every traffic
rule and regulation set forth in the statute under traffic
rules .and regulations.
Starting with Article Two, Section 41-6-11, up to and
including 4-1-6-159. We contend that the effect of the
1955 Act relating to emergency vehicles relieved the
driver of an emergency vehicle from obeying all traffic
rules and regulations applicable to other drivers and

12
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the act imposed upon the driver of an emergency vehicle
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of .all
persons, a term presently to be considered, and shall not
relieve the driver from the consequences of an arbitrary
exercise of the privileges declared in this section. The
perplexing problem is how can the driver of an authorized
emergency vehicle be excused or exonerated from obeying
each and all of the traffic regulations which are imposed
upon other drivers and yet drive with due regard for
the safety of all persons. The Supreme Court of the
State of California was confronted with this problem in
the case of,
Reed vs. Simpson
196 P. 2nd, 895
and in discussing this problem the court says:
"But as plaintiffs maintain, such duty does
not impose the same quantum of care upon the
driver of an emergency vehicle a~ upon motorist~
generally for, in that event, the requirement would
have the absurd result of practically nullifying
the traffic exemption expressly granted by the section. If the driver of an emergency vehicle is at
all times required to drive with due regard for
the safety of the public as all other drivers are
required to do, then all the provisions of these
statutes relating to emergency vehicles become
meaningless and no privileges are granted to them,
but, if his due regard for the safety of others
means that he should by warning give others
.a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of
way, the statute becomes workable for the purpose intended."

13
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And the court concludes that a fair interpretation of
the emergency statute is that the driver of an emergency
vehicle, when responding to an emergency, is only required to give, by suitable warning, a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way and that the standard
of care imposed upon such driver is that he must not
be guilty of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges embraced in the exemption.
It is to be noted that the Reed vs. Simpson case
w.as decided by the Supreme Court of California under
date of August 24, 1948 and that our present statute
was enacted in 1955, or some seven years after the California decision. We think that Instruction Number Five
is a correct statement of the law as it applies to all
drivers of motor vehicles upon the public highway of
this state, limited only by the provisions which relate
to emerg·ency vehicles. In the more difficult question
related to the giving of a proper instruction relating
to the duty of a driver of an emergency vehicle, the
court undertook to do this in Instruction Xumber Six.
Form Number 25.1 in the Utah Forms was clearly framed
under the law as it existed prior to 1955 and as interpreted by this court in the case of,
.Jensen vs. Taylor
271 P. 2nd, 838
2 Utah 2nd, 196
whieh was decided on June 11, 1954, or before the enactInent of the Act of 1955 and clearly cannot apply to the
Aet of 1955 because the suggested forn1 contains the
following language:

14
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"2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop
sign but in doing so must slow down and proceed
with due caution for the safety of the others."
As we have previously pointed out, this duty to slow
down and proceed with due c.aution for the safety of
others is not found in the 1955 emergency act. The court,
therefore, accepted the form of instruction suggested
under California Jury Instructions, Volume II, commencing at Page 810, which contains an elaborate note
on the California decisions and then, at Page 814, Form
215-A, sets out an .approved forrn of instruction which
the courts of California have approved under statutes
similar or almost identical with the 1955 act. And after
the court, rather fully we think, advised the jury as
to the duties and responsibilities of the driver of an
emergency vehicle and defining c.arefully the meaning
of the term:
"Consequences of an arbitr.ary exercise of the
privileges declared in the act."
then proceeds to summarize in the final concluding paragraph as follows:

"It is for you to determine !'rom all of the
evidence in the case whether or not the plaintiff
has proved to your satisfaction, from a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, when
.approaching said intersection faiJ e(l f o drive said
emergency vehicle in due regard for the safety
of all persons, including the ]Jlaintiff, or whether
the defendant was guilty of an arbitraty exercise
of the privileges granted him by reason of the law
as stated above."

15
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The court, therefore, submitted to the jury for its
consideration two problems:
1. Whether or not the defendant, when approach-

ing the intersection, failed to drive said emergency vehicle in due regard for the safety of
all persons, including the plaintiff; and
2. Whether the defendant was guilty of .an arbitrary exercise of the privileges granted him by
reason of the law as stated above.
Incidentally, the court's definition of liability for
arbitrary exercise of privileges is practically identical
with the Utah Form Number 25.10.
We think th.at Instructions Number Five and Six,
when construed together, is a correct statement of the
law as now contained in the 1955 Act. We further contend that no prejudicial error was committed by the
court in the giving of these instructions.
Furthermore, we again revert to the proposition
already discussed, and that is, that if the jury could
have found that the plaintiff was herself guilty of contributory negligence, then the verdict n1ust stand and
the giving of this instruction, even though erroneous,
would not be prejudicial. vVe, of course, do not admit
by this statement that the Instruction Number Six is
t:>rroneous.
In view of the fact that appellant relies upon the
Jensen vs. Taylor case, rited supra, we think it necessary
to discuss this case more in detail. Justice \Y orthen, in
writing the opinion for this rourt, sa~~s:

16
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"Defendant cites and relies on a line of California cases construing statutes different from
ours which reach a result not possible under our
statute and which in our opinion would do violence
to the legislative intent expressed thereiln. It may
well be that the results this defwndant contends
for wmtld be in the public inte1'·est lmt that is
something which the lPg1~slature anil not this cmtrt
must consider."
Apparently the legislature acted upon the advice of this
court because the 1955 legislature en::.cted ~\ new motor
vehicle act in which Section 41-n-1-t y;a>> cmnpletely
changed and the provision contained therein is praetically
identic.al with the California Act as construed by the
Supreme Court of California in the Reed ·1;s. Simpson,
case, cited supra, so that the reasoning of this court
to the effect that the California statutes ~.re different
from ours no longer prevails, and hence the Jensen vs.
Taylor case decision can no longer control and it seem~
to us that in view of the fact that that act "-as rhanged
to conform to the California statute which had already
been construed by the highest court of California is an
impelling reason why this court should adopt the California decision.
l'Tnder the 1955 arnendment the operator of an Pmergency vehicle is no longer required to :-;low down when
entering an intersection with the lights .against him.
Appellant asserts that the defendant "·as guilty of
negligence as a matter of law in failing to :·we the plaintiff's car in the intersection. In th<? Ileed Ps. Simpson.
case the Supreme Court of California discusses this
matter .as follows :

17
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"Of course, if the decedent's conduct were
found to be an arbitrary exercise of his traffic
privileges, as where such driver has given a
reasonably necessary warning but sees that it
has not been observed or heeded and having an
opportunity to stop, he nevertheless continues on
into an inevitable collision, he could not be relieved from negligence because the issue would
then be akin to that involved under the last clear
chance doctrine."
The court then says:
"As the record here discloses, the decedent
was obliged to watch the erratic traffic that he
was pursuing down the boulevard and the jury
could well have found him free from negligence
even though he failed to observe until too late
defendant Simpson's car as it undertook in the
middle of the block to turn across the oncoming
traffic."
The jury could well find frmn the evidence in our case
that the defendant likewise was obliged. to perform
several acts which would divert his attention from seeing
the plaintiff's c.ar. He knew he was driving through the
intersection. He was operating both the siren and the
revolving red light. He was keeping his car under forty
1niles per hour, which required a glance at his speedometer. He knew that 'Yest bound traffic n1ight enter the
intersection where his vision \\"a8 obstructed. He also had
to watch South bound traffic if the light changed. Confronted, therefore, with these requiren1ents, a jury might
well conclude that he was not guilty of negligence in
failing to see the Johnson car. In other words, we contend that it hecame a question of fact for the jury's
18
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determination as to whether or not under all the circumstances he was relieved of negligence in not seeing the
plaintiff's car in the intersection.
POINT 4.
We think that the court was justified in refusing
to give plaintiff's requested instruction No. 8, for the
following reasons :
A.

The language "it follows that in the exercise
of ordinary care the amount of caution required by the law increa::;es as does the danger
that reasonably should be anticipated" would
be confusing to a jury because it would apply
the doctrine of ordinary care as therein defined to the driver of an emergency vehicle,
notwithstanding the exemptions granted
under the act.

B.

We think the subject was fully covered by
the instructions as given by the court.

C.

We cannot see how plaintiff's rights were
in any way prejudiced.

POINT 5.
Here again, the requested instruction X o. 11 applies
a rule of conduct which is not applicable to an emergency vehicle situation. The requested instruction says
that the plaintiff had the right to presume that no vehicle
would be operated against the red tratfic control light
and that she was not required to anticipate the presence
of a police vehicle. Certainly the driver of a vehicle
charged with a knowledge of the law cannot presume that
an emergency vehicle might not be operated against a
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red light because the controlling statute gives them that
right. Here again the requested instruction would apply
had there been no emergency vehicle involved. Appellant says (see page 36) that:
"The section of the Utah Code can only be
interpreted as meaning that the driver of an
emergency vehicle does not enjoy any of the
privileges set forth in 41-6-14 unless he sounds
his sirens so as to give other drivers reasonable
opportunity either to stay out of his path or to
get out of his path."
The evidence in this case showed without dispute
that the plaintiff could stop her car within six feet. She,
therefore, had ample time during which the siren was
sounding and the light was burning to have stopped
her car before entering the East half of "\V.ashington.
Boulevard.
POINT. 6.
UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT
As we understand appellant, there is no contention
that the instruction on unavoidable accident "\\·as not a
correct statement of the law. In fact, it is copied from·
California Fonns No. 134. Appellant, however, contends
that it was error for the court to instruct on unavoidable
accident because :

A.

It was not affirmatively pleaded; and

B.

That there was no evidence justifying the
court in giving the instruction.
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A. While there is authority to the contrary, we
think the great weight of authority supports our contention that unavoidable accident is not an affirmative defense and need not be specially pleaded. This is definitely
the law of the State of California. See
Parker vs. W ormack
230 P. 2nd 823
Driver vs. Norman
236 P. 2nd 6
Faeh vs. Union Hotel
236 P. 2nd 667
Sherrillo vs. Stone and W estler
244 P. 2nd 70
Hooper vs. Bronson
266 P. 2nd 590
Webb vs. Hardin
Arizona
89 P. 2nd 30
Seele vs. Purcell
(New Mexico)
113 P. 2nd 320
Rowton vs. Kemp
(Oklahoma)
125 P. 2nd 1003
Attention is also called to the fact that Rule 8-C lists affinnative defenses which must be pleaded and unavoidable accident is not listed therein, which is a clear indication that unavoidable accident is not regarded as an affirmative defense which must be pleaded.
B. Assuming that an instruction on unavoidable
accident may in a proper case be given under a general
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denial, then the remaining question is whether or not the
giving of this instruction constituted prejudicial error.
Many of the cases cited supra deal with this question. In
the Parker case, it was held that unless the defendant
is guilty of negligence as a matter of law it is proper for
the court to give an instruction on unavoidable accident.
ln our opinion, the following evidence justified the court
in giving this instruction. Defendant was accorded certain privileges while responding to an emergency call.
As he approached the intersection both the light and the
siren were in operation. The plaintiff, upon entering the
intersection and proceeding Easterly, had a clear unobstructed view of the approaching vehicle. The defendant, in the exercising of his responding to an emergency
call, was required to do a number of things prior to and
while passing through the intersection. His attention of
necessity could not be directed solely to East bound
traffic. He was required to watch for West bound traffic, watch his speed and observe the semaphore light to
see whether cars might approach from the X orth upon a
change of signal. \Ye submit that under the facts as presented and the inference which the jury was entitled to
draw therefrom, a jury might well conclude that the
plaintiff, upon seeing the green light, inadvertently failed
to look to her right, failed to observe what was clearly
to be observed and, thinking the intersection clear for
her passage, and that, on the other hand, the defendant,
looking to the West and seeing no c.ar approaching from
that direction, and believing that no East bound car would
enter the intersection ahead of him, and considering the
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emergency statute which in effect repeals all traffic
regulations, that a jury might well conclude the accident
was unavoidable.
Furthermore, we contend that the g1v1ng of this
instruction was not prejudicial to the plaintiff.
POINT 7.
Did the court commit prejudicial error in giving
an instruction on assumption of risk '1
While it is true that the doctrine of assmnption of
risk was at first limited to controversies between master
and servant, it has been extended to cover other situations. In the case of,
Wold vs. Ogden City
258 P. 2nd 453
this court .applied the doctrine to a situation which did
not involve a controversy between master and servant.
We think that most of the rnodern cases have extended
the rule and made it applicable in all cases where there
is evidence to justify its application. The doctrine has
been applied in railroad crossing cases where the driver
has tried to beat the oncoming train acrm;s the track.
We fail to see any logical reason why the doctrine should
not be applied in an intersection case. The question, it
seems to us, resolves itself into this proposition: Was
there evidence or inference deductible therefrom which
justified the court in giving an instruction on the law
of assumption of risk~
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Plaintiff called as an expert witness Officer Bennett
who testified concerning speeds, distances travelled and
distances within which cars could be stopped at various
speeds. On cross examination he admitted what of course
is obvious that if the defendant was proceeding at a
speed of forty miles per hour K orthward for a distance
of one hundred twenty feet and the plaintiff was proceeding Eastward at a speed of five miles per hour,
that in order for the two cars to meet at the point' of
contact the plaintiff's car would have to travel fifteen
feet. He further admitted that if the plaintiff was travelling at a speed of five miles per hour, she could stop
within six feet, which also included reaction time. The
jury could well find that plaintiff had a clear .and unobstructed view of the approaching car with lights burning and siren sounding when she was back at least fifteen
feet from the point of impact; that she could have stopped
within six feet and that she had the entire 'Vestern half
of Washington Boulevard open and unobstructed, there
being no Southbound traffic on Washington Boulevard.
Clearly there w.as no danger of a collision until plaintiff
passed into the Eastern half of Washington Boulevard.
A jury could well conclude from this evidence that plaintiff atten1pted to cross through the intersection ahead
of the oncoming vehicle and, of course, had she succeeded
in moving a few feet further Easterly before the impact,
there would have been no collision.
The evidence, we think, justified the submission of
the issue of assumption of risk to the jury. If they
believed from the evidence that plaintiff had ample time
24
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to stop before reaching the center, but instead of doing
so, she continued on into the path of an oncoming emergency vehicle, believing that she had time to cross its
line of traffic before the car reached the point of impact,
but that she was mistaken, either in the speed of the
oncoming car or her own speed, a jury could well conclude
that she thereby assumed the risk of attempting to cle.ar
the portion of the intersection upon which the e1nergency
vehicle was travelling before it reached the point of impact.

It must also be remembered that the plaintiff was
unable to remember anything which had occurred as
much as three days before the accident, so th.at the
matter was left somewhat to inferences which the jury
might draw from the evidence. We think, therefore, that
the court was justified in submitting to the jury the
issue of assumption of risk.
Appellant, on page 45, quotes from 65 C.J.S., 851
to 853, in which it is stated generally that in order to
invoke the rule, it is essential that plaintiff, who exposed
himself to danger, or who continued so to expose himself,
shall have done so voluntarily. vV e say that the jury
could certainly find from the evidence and the reasonable
inferences deducible therefrom, that the plaintiff did
voluntarily expose herself to the risk of beating the
oncoming emergency vehicle across its pathway.
Appellant further quotes the text to the effect that
knowledge and appreciation of danger is also necessary
to invoke the doctrine of assuming rjsk. If the jury could
infer that plaintiff knew of the approachjng vehicle in
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time to have stopped before entering the Eastern half of
Washington Boulevard, but that she chose to continue
forward, believing that she had ample time to cross ahead
of the oncoming emergency vehicle, then the jury could
well conclude that the risk or danger of so acting should
have been known to her and appreciated by her.
We contend that by reason of the suspension of all
traffic rules governing drivers generally in case of an
emergency vehicle, it of necessity does expose the travelling public to inherent dangers which might be classed
as unavoidable, but the legislature has felt that the public
interest is better subserved by granting this immunity
to emergency vehicles, even though it thereby exposes
the travelling public to dangers which would not have
been encountered but for the fact that it is an emergency
vehicle, and, therefore, the court was justified in instructing the jury both as to unavoidable accident and assumption of risk. We contend further that the giving of this
instruction was not prejudicial.

POINT 8.
Appellant has attached to the transcript a statement
hy the trial judge concerning an incident which occurred
during the deliberation of the jury. "\Ye object to this
eourt's consideration of this affidavit. "\Ye do not believe
that it properly forms a p.art of the transcript. However,
quite apart from this, the jury asked the judge to give
thern some further instruction as to whether or not the
dod rine of an act of God might apply. The judge tried
to rontaet the attornt>y~ but was unable to find either
26
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of them. He then went to the door of the jury ro01n
and upon being asked that question he advised the jury
that the doctrine of an act of God did not apply and
reminded the jury that they must decide this case on
the evidence presented and the instructions given them
by the court. Shortly thereafter, the court encountered
plaintiff's counsel and informed him of what had taken
place. He made no objections whatsoever to the proceedings. He now complains that the court should have proceeded to explain to the jury what w.as the difference
between an act of God and unavoidable accident. He
certainly had an opportunity to object if he had wanted
to do so.
He further contends that the court should have
brought the jury back into the courtroom. He 1nade no
such request.
It seems to us th.at the plaintiff was perfectly willing
to accept what had been done without any objection until
after the verdict of the jury was returned. We do not
believe that he now has any right to complaint after
he has experimented with the jury's verdict.
CONCLUSION
Respondent sincerely believes that the case was fully
and fairly tried; th.at the court's instructions, taken as
a whole, were fair to both sides; that no prejudicial error
was committed and that this case should he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LEROY B. YouNG, of
YouNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys at Lwr
1018 F1 irst Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, etah
Attorneys for Respondent
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